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A ‘new Kyoto’, called for by the Australian government, may well be based on 
cap-and-trade, but with significant changes. Under the old Kyoto, broad 
participation and meaningful commitments were difficult to achieve – in part 
because of uncertainty about compliance costs and the dichotomy between 
countries with targets and those without. This policy brief examines options for 
making greenhouse gas commitments under a `New Kyoto' more flexible: 
intensity targets, sectoral targets, non-binding targets, permit price caps, and 
linking targets with commitments for technology development. We also touch on 





Australian National University 
Economics and Environment Network  
Policy Brief EEN0610 
 
12 December 2006 
 Summary 
  A successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol after 2012 may well be based around cap-and-trade. 
A variety of design options exist to counter cost uncertainty, make countries' greenhouse gas 
commitments more flexible and break down the target/no target dichotomy. 
  Intensity targets could link targets to future GDP levels, with indexation customized to each 
country’s circumstances and preferences. They could reduce cost uncertainty for all 
countries, yield greater expected benefit, and lead to more stringent environmental 
commitments. 
  Non-binding targets could be used as ‘entry-level’ commitments to draw in a limited number 
of countries into a post-Kyoto treaty, especially those with high degrees of risk aversion. 
Their main role would be to help break the political impasse over commitments for 
developing countries. 
  Sectoral targets could cover specific industrial sectors in the largest emitting countries, and 
so help address carbon leakage concerns in the absence of national caps for all developing 
countries. Sectoral targets however need to be integrated with broad-based international 
emissions trading, a topic little researched so far. 
  Price caps could help protect permit buying countries from overly high compliance costs, and 
bring greater expected benefits by reducing uncertainty, especially to permit buyers. 
However, they can generate large public revenues, and hence political difficulties.  
  Commitments for funding of technology development could be recognized alongside 
commitments to reduce emissions. This would broaden the scope of a future agreement and 
provide direct links to technology-focused initiatives such as AP6.  
  Policy options outside the cap-and-trade (control by quantity) approach include taxes with 
thresholds (control by price), and hybrid price-quantity models such as the McKibbin-
Wilcoxen proposal. However, most international discussion on future climate policy is 
concerned with cap-and-trade schemes and variants thereof. 
  Combinations of flexibility options are possible, creating a continuum between limited and 
largely risk-free commitments at one end of the scale, and Kyoto-style targets at the other 
end, though interactions between policies still need to be explored. This increases the 
negotiation space for a post-2012 treaty, and improves the chances of achieving broader 
participation, including by developing countries. 
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Policy context 
There is renewed urgency to forge a 
meaningful international climate change 
agreement. The Australian government has 
called for a ‘new Kyoto’, and the Prime 
Minister has announced a task group on 
emissions trading, to ‘advise on the nature and 
design of a workable global emissions trading 
system in which Australia would be able to 
participate’ (Prime Minister, media release 10 
December 2006). Despite criticisms of Kyoto’s 
target-based approach, the political momentum 
is with cap-and-trade for greenhouse gas 
control, with Europe and a number of US 
states going down that path. A ‘new Kyoto’ 
arising from the UN process, for the period 
after 2012, would very likely take cap-and-
trade as a starting point, and one arising from 
the Asia-Pacific Partnership (AP6) may well 
too.  
To achieve broad participation and meaningful 
commitments, the rules of the game need to be 
right. Shortcomings of the Kyoto approach are 
uncertainty about the future cost of complying 
with a particular commitment, and the 
dichotomy between countries with emissions 
targets and those without. But there are a 
variety of design options to counter cost 
uncertainty, make greenhouse gas 
commitments more flexible and break down 
the target/no target dichotomy.  
This policy brief looks at intensity (indexed) 
targets, sectoral targets, non-binding (opt-out) 
targets, permit price caps, and linking targets 
with commitments for technology 
development. We also touch on market-based 
mechanisms that do not have targets at their 
core. Here we do not discuss equity 
implications of each instrument, and focus on 
their use in an international agreement rather 
than in domestic policies. The degree of 
analytical research that has been done differs 
between the options. We refer to our own 
research, as well as selected contributions in 
the literature. 
Intensity targets 
Intensity targets would be framed in terms of 
emissions intensity, that is, emissions per 
dollar of GDP. Intensity targets (also referred 
to as dynamic, indexed, relative, or rate-based 
targets) were originally conceived as a way to 
engage developing countries in the Kyoto 
Protocol (Baumert et al. 1999).  
They received renewed attention since the 
Bush administration’s pledge to reduce the 
greenhouse gas intensity of the US economy 
by 18% from 2002 to 2012 (under the 'Climate 
Change Initiative'). Recently, China announced 
a goal to reduce energy intensity by 20% from 
2006 to 2010 (under the 11
th 5-year plan), and 
the Canadian government plans to set goals for 
future emissions intensity (under the ‘Clean 
Air Act’ of 2006). Clearly, intensity targets 
can be politically more acceptable than Kyoto-
style absolute targets.  
The main attraction is that intensity targets are 
more generous if economic growth is fast, with 
extra permits to accommodate higher 
emissions. Conversely, the target is tighter in 
absolute terms if economic growth is slow.  
An intensity target would not need to be 
indexed one-to-one to GDP. Rather, the degree 
of indexation could be varied according to   2
countries’ preferences and circumstances 
(Ellerman and Sue Wing 2003). There could 
be a continuum from Kyoto-style absolute 
targets, through partially indexed targets, to 
one-to-one indexation or even ‘super-
indexation’.  
We have developed a theoretical formula for 
the optimal degree of indexation, and 
empirically modeled a hypothetical 2020 
global greenhouse gas treaty, under multiple 
uncertainties (Jotzo and Pezzey 2006b). 
Optimal indexation depends on the strength of 
the emissions–GDP linkage in each country, 
and the stringency of its target relative to 
business-as-usual.  
The modeling shows that optimal indexation 
varies greatly between countries, especially if 
there is full coverage of greenhouse gases and 
sources. This is because the link between 
emissions and GDP tends to be much stronger 
in the energy sector than in other parts of the 
economy. For Australia, optimal indexation in 
an illustrative modeling scenario would be 0.8, 
so that a 1% rise in Australia’s GDP above 
expectations would result in a rise of 0.8% in 
Australia’s emissions target. Specific results 
depend on the target’s coverage and 
stringency, and expected GDP-emissions 
linkage. 
The expected benefits from an international 
emissions trading treaty could be significantly 
higher under intensity targets, because of 
reduced risk of over- or undershooting 
expected costs. And if governments are risk-
averse regarding future compliance costs, 
commitments under intensity targets could be 
more stringent.  
A criticism of intensity targets is that the 
amount of emissions allowable under a treaty 
with intensity targets is not fixed, so 
uncertainty is shifted away from costs and on 
to emissions. However this is not an effective 
argument against target indexation in the 
greenhouse case, because 1) intensity targets 
may make more stringent targets possible in 
the first place; 2) GDP fluctuations tend to 
cancel out between countries; and 3) any over- 
or undershooting of desired emissions at some 
point in time can be compensated by 
periodically adjusting targets. 
Other concerns are that intensity targets always 
‘look’ more stringent because of the 
underlying decline in emissions intensity, and 
so could be used to obfuscate lack of ambition 
– emissions levels may still increase despite a 
reduction in emissions intensity. This could be 
countered by formulating targets as absolute 
amounts, plus an indexation component that is 
linked to future GDP. 
Multi-country sectoral targets 
Targets could be set for specific sectors or 
industries in the major producing countries, as 
an alternative or complement to Kyoto-style 
national targets. Sectoral targets could apply in 
energy intensive industries such as iron and 
steel, aluminium, chemicals, cement, and pulp 
and paper. Their level relative to the baseline 
could differ between sectors and countries, and 
could include different features such as 
indexation or non-bindingness (see the recent 
proposal by the Centre for Clean Air Policy, 
Schmidt et al. 2006).   3
The sectoral approach would allow targets to 
be tailored to each industry’s circumstances, 
and they are likely to be easier to negotiate 
than country-level targets. Only the major 
players in each industry would need to be 
covered for the scheme to be effective, and 
only a small number of developing countries 
would need to be brought on board in each of 
the main industrial sectors. For example, just 
three countries (China, India and Brazil) 
account for over 90% of all developing 
countries’ emissions in the iron and steel 
sector (Schmidt et al. 2006). Sectoral targets 
could thus help address the problem of 
relocation of industrial production (‘carbon 
leakage’). 
Sectoral targets however are no stand-alone 
solution, as they are likely to only cover a 
modest share of total emissions. They may 
work for traded energy intensive goods such as 
metals, chemicals and cement, but would be 
more difficult to apply to electricity 
generation, and are even less suitable for 
emissions sources such as residential energy 
use, transport, or agriculture.  
Further, sectoral targets will mean different 
required levels of effort in each country and 
sector. For overall cost effectiveness, it will be 
imperative to link sectoral targets to wider 
emissions trading, to achieve equalization of 
marginal abatement costs. Sectoral targets 
therefore would work best if integrated with 
overall national targets in countries that take 
on such commitments, and fully linked to 
international emissions trading in countries 
that only take on commitments for some 
sectors. For example, under a post-2012 treaty 
key developing and industrializing countries 
might have targets only for selected sectors, 
while for developed countries the 
corresponding sectoral targets would be added 
into a national cap. 
Non-binding targets 
Non-binding targets would allow some 
countries to opt out of their target and the cap-
and-trade scheme, without penalty. The idea of 
non-binding targets (also referred to as ‘opt-
out’ or ‘no-lose’ targets) is squarely aimed at 
bringing developing countries into a future 
climate treaty (Philibert 2000). Non-binding 
targets feature in various proposals for a post-
2012 climate policy architecture, typically as a 
stepping stone for developing countries on the 
way to binding targets further down the track.  
The rationale for non-binding targets is that for 
countries with ample abatement options, taking 
on a fairly generous greenhouse target should 
be profitable, as the revenue from selling spare 
permits should outstrip the cost of freeing up 
those permits. Thus if all goes well, the non-
binding target would indeed be enacted. Non-
bindingness creates an 'emergency exit', to be 
used if the target agreed earlier turned out too 
hard to achieve. Non-bindingness can apply 
only to a few countries, as binding targets are 
needed for buyers in order to guarantee 
demand in the permit market.  
Non-binding targets could to a large extent 
eliminate the risk to a country of incurring a 
loss from an emissions commitment. This 
makes them an attractive option for bringing 
highly risk-averse countries on board of a post-
2012 treaty, and also for countries where 
institutional foundations are still being 
developed.    4
Our modeling (Jotzo and Pezzey 2006a) shows 
that a non-binding target could be much more 
stringent in level terms than a conventional 
target that is equally acceptable to the country 
in question. However, the reduction in risk to 
countries with the non-binding target goes 
hand in hand with the risk that the treaty 
parties collectively miss out on access to low-
cost abatement options in the country in 
question, if the target is not enacted. The effect 
of non-binding targets on expected global 
benefits could go either way. We conclude that 
non-binding targets would be best used to help 
draw a limited number highly risk-averse 
countries into a future agreement, ideally with 
reasonably generous target levels, to ensure a 
high probability of the target being enacted. 
In their implementation, non-binding targets 
would provide additional challenges because 
of increased regulatory uncertainty for 
domestic industries. On the other hand, they 
could help countries where progress with 
institution building is uncertain. Opt-out 
provisions may be relevant not just if 
emissions trajectories turn out higher than 
expected, but also if domestic arrangements 
for emissions accounting and control policies 
fail. 
Price caps 
A price cap would set up a maximum or 
capped price (also referred to as a ‘safety 
valve’ or `trigger price') for permits traded in 
the international market, by making additional 
permits always available at the 'cap' price. This 
would protect buyers of emissions permits 
from the risk of excessive compliance costs. In 
existing permit trading schemes, compliance 
penalties in some respects act as de-facto price 
caps. Price caps were earlier promoted in the 
United States to help make Kyoto ratification 
possible, by limiting US exposure to the risk of 
overly high compliance costs.  
A price cap addresses the main economic 
argument for control by price instruments 
(emission taxes) rather than by quantity 
instruments (tradable emission permits) for 
greenhouse gas control; it is in effect a hybrid 
of the two types of instrument. Under 
uncertainty, getting the cost of emissions 
control wrong (as can happen with permits) 
has far greater efficiency costs than getting the 
amount of emissions released into the 
atmosphere wrong (as can happen with taxes) 
That is because climate damages are caused by 
the huge accumulated stock of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, rather than just a few 
years' emissions.  
Earlier modeling analyses of the price caps 
showed very large gains in expected benefits 
compared to pure permit trading, especially if 
the combination of targets and price cap were 
set so that the cap applied most of the time 
(Pizer 2002). Our own analysis (Jotzo 2006) 
confirms that significant efficiency gains can 
be achieved, especially if a minimum price 
were set alongside a maximum price (price 
floor and ceiling). Yet the gains estimated in 
our multi-region model are much smaller than 
those in single-region models, because the 
permit price tends to be less volatile with a 
greater number of participants in trading.  
Price caps could result in large public revenues 
from the sale of additional permits into the 
market. Such revenue would need to be   5
distributed among participating parties, or 
spent on agreed activities. This could 
complicate international negotiations, or even 
destabilize agreement if the amounts involved 
turn out to be very large. The closer to the 
expected or desired permit price that the price 
cap is set, and so the closer the system is to 
price control, the greater are expected revenues 
and resulting political difficulties.  
Price caps would increase the chances for a 
meaningful post-2012 international climate 
agreement, by providing a safeguard for 
countries with ambitious targets. However, 
their role probably will need to be confined as 
a ‘safety valve’ rather than as de-facto price-
based control, because of the political 
difficulties inherent in large revenues.  
Commitments for technology 
development 
A flexible future climate agreement could 
incorporate funding commitments for climate 
change related activities, and this link is 
increasingly recognized as an integral part to 
an effective future regime. For example, the 
São Paulo proposal (BASIC 2006), one of 
many proposed roadmaps for a post-2012 
climate policy architecture, suggests that rich 
countries should have the choice of fulfilling 
part of their overall commitments by financing 
technology development or climate change 
adaptation measures in poorer countries.  
The advantage of such an approach is that it 
would recognize efforts that do not result in 
short-term emissions reductions within each 
country, but that help pave the way to long-
term global reductions. It could help build a 
bridge between efforts under the UNFCCC and 
technology-focused initiatives such as the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (AP6), and provide 
incentives to adequately resource such 
initiatives. For example, it could immediately 
reward efforts by Australia to develop carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology, or 
efforts to improve renewable energy 
technologies.  
Agreeing on what efforts and funding are 
eligible may prove difficult. A simple solution 
would be to set up global funds along the lines 
of the Global Environment Facility and only 
count contributions made to these funds, but 
that would forego setting incentives for action 
at the national, bilateral or regional scale. If 
funding and emissions commitments were to 
be traded off, then an ‘exchange rate’ would be 
needed between dollars spent and emissions 
reduction commitments undertaken.  
Policy options outside the cap-and-
trade approach 
For completeness, we list three policy options 
which are not flexible commitments within the 
Kyoto Protocol, but are closely related to some 
options above.  First, pure taxes on greenhouse 
gas emissions are in principle better than 
tradable permits, because as noted above, the 
benefit of controlling the emission price, by 
using a tax, is greater than the benefit of 
controlling short-term emission quantities, by 
using tradable permits.  However, a pure tax 
generates huge revenues which have proved to 
be politically unacceptable, and form one   6
reason why the Kyoto Protocol uses permit 
trading. 
Second is a proposal by Pezzey (2003) for an 
emission tax with thresholds.  Under this, a tax 
is paid only above thresholds, and subsidies 
are paid for emissions below thresholds.   
Thresholds can then be distributed across and 
within countries in order to yield about the 
same revenue as a roughly equivalent permit 
trading scheme. This could defuse political 
opposition to emission taxation. 
Third is the scheme by McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen (2002) for a system of short-term 
and long-term permit trading within a country, 
which acts as a price-quantity hybrid. It has 
elements of the price-cap schemes above, 
though has no international permit trading. 
Certainty about the maximum short-term 
permit price is one of its attractions. 
However, most international discussion on 
climate policy is concerned with cap-and-trade 
schemes and variants thereof, rather than brand 
new schemes such as taxes with thresholds, or 
McKibbin & Wilcoxen's Blueprint. 
Combining flexibility options 
The options for flexible emissions targets 
discussed above could be combined (see figure 
below). For example, non-binding or sectoral 
targets could be framed in terms of intensity, 
and sectoral targets could be non-binding – 
which would make them conceptually 
equivalent to extending the Clean 
Development Mechanism (the Kyoto 
Protocol’s offset mechanism) to the sector-
level, as has also been proposed.  
This makes for a broad spectrum of 
commitments, from highly flexible ones that 
apply to only parts of the economy at one end 
of the scale, to Kyoto-style national targets at 
the other. Each country could negotiate a 
different mix of commitments, to suit its 
circumstances and preferences. 
Careful mechanism design would be essential, 
as greater flexibility brings greater complexity. 
Issues of potential interaction between 
flexibility options have not yet been fully 
researched. Negotiations would also be more 
complex as they range over more dimensions. 
These caveats aside, it is clear that the target-
based approach does not need to be nearly as 
rigid as under the pre-2012 Kyoto Protocol. 
Flexible commitments greatly improve the 
scope for agreement, by better accommodating 
developed countries’ needs and by providing 
options for entry-level commitments by 
developing and industrializing countries. 
Consequently, flexible commitments around 
cap-and-trade hold promise for a ‘new Kyoto’, 
and indeed a ‘better Kyoto’, whether it arises 
from the UNFCCC process or under the AP6 
umbrella. 
   7
References 
BASIC (2006), "The Sao Paulo proposal for an agreement on future international climate policy", 
Discussion paper for COP12 and COP-MOP2, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Baumert, K. A., Bhandari, R. and Kete, N. (1999), What might a developing country climate 
commitment look like?, World Resources Institute, Washington DC. 
Ellerman, A. D. and Sue Wing, I. (2003), "Absolute versus intensity-based emission caps", Climate 
Policy 3(Supplement 2): S7-S20. 
Jotzo, F. (2006), "Price caps for international permit trading under uncertainty with heterogeneous 
market participants", Paper presented at 3rd World Congress of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Kyoto. 
Jotzo, F. and Pezzey, J. (2006a), "Non-binding targets for international emissions trading under 
uncertainty", Paper presented at 3rd World Congress of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Kyoto. 
Jotzo, F. and Pezzey, J. C. V. (2006b), "Optimal intensity targets for emissions trading under 
uncertainty", Economics and Environment Network Working Paper EEN0605, Australian 
National University, Canberra. 
McKibbin, W. J. and Wilcoxen, P. J. (2002), Climate change policy after Kyoto: Blueprint for a 
realistic approach, Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 
Pezzey, J. C. V. (2003), "Emission taxes and tradable permits: a comparison of views on long run 
efficiency", Environmental and Resource Economics 26(2): 329-342. 
Philibert, C. (2000), "How could emissions trading benefit developing countries", Energy Policy 28: 
947-956. 
Pizer, W. A. (2002), "Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change", 
Journal of Public Economics 85: 409-434. 
Schmidt, J., Helme, N., Lee, J. and Houdashelt, M. (2006), "Sector-based Approach to the Post-2012 
Climate Change Policy Architecture", Future Actions Dialogue Working Paper, Center for 
Clean Air Policy, Washington DC. 
   8










Flexible emissions targets&trading Other commitments
Technology policy: 
development, 
deployment 
Funding/transfers 
to developing 
countries  